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processing, face much greater challenges organising in their primary jurisdictions because they are 
confronted with more mobile, more global, and more powerful and effective employer opposition, and, in 
some cases, a workforce less predisposed to unionisation. Yet, as we have seen, even in the most 
adverse organising environments, union organising success can dramatically improve when unions utilise 
a comprehensive campaign strategy. Given these differences, what is perhaps most striking about our 
findings is how few unions are actually running comprehensive campaigns, or even consistently using any 
of the ten elements of our comprehensive campaign model. Most significant of all, only a smattering of 
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truly multifaceted comprehensive campaign. They are not developing lasting labour and community 
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and the public ranging from universal health care, to the war in Iraq, global outsourcing, to affordable 
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Chapter 10 
THE US EXPERIENCE OF ORGANISING IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
Kate Bronfenbrenner 
In late January of 2008 the US Bureau of Labor Statistics issued their 
annual report revealing that US unions had added approximately 310,000 
new members in 2007, resulting in an increase in union density from 
12.0 per cent in 2006 to 12.1 per cent in 2007 (BLS, 2007). A 12.1 per 
cent figure is a shockingly low density rate and a . 1 per cent increase is 
indeed very small. However, across the US unions celebrated the news 
as a clear signal they had turned a corner. Economic policy experts Ben 
Sipperer and John Schmitt explain the significance of the news: 
The increase is small, and may well reflect statistical variation 
rather than an actual increase in the union membership share, but 
the uptick is striking because it is the first time since the BLS be-
gan collecting annual union membership rates in 1983 that the 
union share has increased (Sipperer and Schmitt, 2008). 
And the response from unions to the news was swift. No sooner had the 
report been released than the Service Employees' International Union 
(SEIU) issued a press release headlined 'SEIU Drives Growth as Union 
Workforce Increases for First Time in Years', followed by: 
Seeking to improve their lives and the wide range of services they 
provide in their communities, 114,158 workers voted to unite in 
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in 2007. 
186 The State of the Unions 
SEIU's growth last year accounted for nearly 25 per cent of the 
total union growth across the country, solidifying SEIU's role as 
America's fastest-growing union (SEIU, 2008). 
While there is no question that SEIU can lay claim to a significant share 
of the nation's recent organising gains, the fact remains that what is be-
ing celebrated here is that the US labour movement eked out one-tenth of 
a percentage point more than standing still. This year for the first time in 
twenty-five years unions managed to both organise more union members 
than are lost each year to plant closings, outsourcing, layoffs, contracting 
out, privatisation, technological change and decertification, and also 
keep pace with job growth in the unorganised sectors of the economy. 
As shown in Figure 10.1, union membership in the US has remained 
fairly stable for the last sixty years as density started its decline from its 
peak of 35.4 in the mid-1940s. The overall decline would have been much 
steeper if there had not been the rapid growth of public sector union den-
sity between 1960 through 1980, which has averaged around 36 per cent 
since 1985. In contrast, union density in the private sector began a steady 
decline dropping more rapidly in the 1980s until 1999, the first time that 
density held steady since 1980. In that highly celebrated year, unlike this 
year, unions were able to point to large victories: 75,000 homecare work-
ers organised in California by SEIU, tens of thousands of teachers organ-
ised by AFT in Puerto Rico, several large hotels in Las Vegas by HERE, 
two large white collar units (CWA at US Airways and LAM at United) 
under the Railway Labor Act, and perhaps most dramatic of all, after more 
than twenty years and multiple elections, UNITE's victory at Pillowtex, 
formerly Cannon Mills, in North Carolina (Bronfenbrenner, 2000,2001). 
That year the labour movement talked about having organised 
500,000 workers, turning a corner, reversing the decline. But it was also 
the last year of an expanding economy and the year before an election. 
The next year in 2000, as in every other election year, organisers were 
pulled off organising campaigns to work on the Gore-Lieberman cam-
paign. Few campaigns were started that winter and instead of a resur-
gence there was a drop in density each year, worsened by the fear that 
followed 9/11. It would not level out again until 2007 when once again 
catching up, or standing still, is cause for celebration. 
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188 The State of the Unions 
Yet the fact is, 'standing still' in 1999 required a great deal more work 
for unions than it did in 1989, and standing still in 2008 requires even 
more effort. For, each year, the challenge for unions became even more 
difficult, as job growth expanded ever more rapidly in industries and sec-
tors where union density was lowest, and outsourcing and plant closings 
combined to devastate industries where unions predominated (Bronfen-
brenner and Luce, 2004). Thus, by my estimates, where in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s unions needed to organise at least 300,000 workers to 
keep up with job expansion in non-union jobs and job loss in union jobs 
they continued to organise under 300,000 in the public and private sector 
combined. As the 1990s moved forward the magic number increased to 
500,000 and in 1999 they finally reached that number. But today, when 
hundreds of thousands of union jobs are shifted out of the country due to 
global outsourcing alone (Bronfenbrenner and Luce, 2004), unions need 
to be organising hundreds of thousands more workers each year, and can 
ill afford to celebrate gains as insignificant as . 1 per cent. 
The Organising Numbers - The Last Decade 
Starting in the late 1990s, some unions, such as SEIU, UNITE HERE, 
UAW, AFSCME, and CWA began increasingly to focus their efforts on 
organising outside the NLRB. Public sector unions, such as AFSCME 
and AFT, stepped up their organising efforts, most notably in Maryland 
and Puerto Rico, which part way through the decade gained collective 
bargaining protection for public sector employees. In another innovative 
effort, SEIU and AFSCME began to work with state and local govern-
ments to set up special authorities to bring home care and child day 
workers under the aegis of a single large public employer, and under a 
campaign neutrality agreement, to make workers that were heretofore 
some of the most difficult to organise because of their isolated agency 
employee status into large, safe public employee campaigns. 
Because of the scale of these efforts, in recent years the net number 
of new workers organised through NLRB elections has been entirely 
overshadowed by the much larger number of workers organised in a se-
ries of major non-board victories in homecare, building service, wireless 
communications, laundry services, health care, hotels and the public sec-
tor. Still, the overwhelming majority of US unions continue to concen-
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trate their organising resources and efforts in traditional NLRB cam-
paigns, albeit with limited success. 
Even with new organising initiatives, the number of elections, which 
had hovered between 3,000 per year since the late 1980s, slowly began 
to drop down in the last five years, reaching below 2,000 for the first 
time in 2006. Although NLRB election win rates increased from 51 per 
cent in 1997 to 61 per cent in 2006, it would be premature to see this as 
an indicator of organising success and membership growth. For while 
win rates have increased, the per cent of eligible voters in units where the 
union won the election remains much lower, still only 53.9 per cent. 
When we factor in an average first contract rate of less than 70 per cent, 
this means that less than a third of workers who endeavor to organise 
under the NLRB are able to gain representation under a collective bar-
gaining agreement (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2004; BNA Plus, 2007). 
Table 10.1: NLRB Representation Elections, 2002-2006 
Year 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
AFL-CIO, 2006 
CTW, 2006 
Number of 
Elections 
2,724 
2,351 
2,363 
2,137 
1,657 
768 
732 
% Win 
Rate 
56.8% 
58.3% 
58.6% 
61.3% 
61.4% 
60.2% 
56.4% 
Number of 
Eligible 
Voters 
189,863 
150,047 
166,525 
125,305 
112,598 
50,049 
52,299 
Number in 
Elections 
Won 
81,364 
77,427 
84,838 
64,502 
60,087 
23,101 
26,245 
% of Voters 
in Elections 
Won 
42.9% 
51.6% 
50.9% 
51.5% 
53.4% 
46.2% 
50.2% 
Source: BNA Plus, 2007. 
As shown in Table 10.1, one noteworthy factor is that the AFL-CIO and 
Change to Win are not only running equal numbers of NLRB campaigns 
but their success rate is remarkably similar. CTW has a slightly lower 
win rate but is winning in larger units so has brings in 3,000 more work-
ers a year through the NLRB than the AFL-CIO. Win rates under the 
NLRB are notably higher in service sector industries such as health care 
190 The State of the Unions 
(69.7 per cent) than in manufacturing (46.1 per cent), communications 
(31.8 per cent) or retail 53.2 per cent) (BNA Plus, 2007). 
Organising Outside the NLRB 
As mentioned earlier, NLRB certification elections are one of several 
mechanisms under which new workers are organised in the US each 
year. Workers in the railway and airline industry organise in elections 
supervised by the National Mediation Board. Public sector workers em-
ployed in state and local government entities organise through certifica-
tion elections supervised by more than forty different labour relations 
agencies in the thirty-seven states that have collective bargaining legisla-
tion covering at least some public workers in the state. In several states, 
including Washington, New York, Minnesota, and Ohio, there are also 
state-supervised card check certifications. Although they have limited 
collective bargaining rights, federal workers organise through govern-
ment supervised certification elections. In recent years there has also 
been a wave of public sector organising in Puerto Rico following the 
passage of public employee collective bargaining legislation in 1998. 
Unfortunately, because there is no centralised database tracking organis-
ing activity and outcomes in state and local elections, we have no sys-
temised national data on public sector organising activity and outcomes. 
In the last decade, as the environment for organising in the private 
sector became increasingly challenging, more and more unions focused 
their efforts on organising outside the traditional NLRB process through 
card check recognition and, to a lesser extent, community supervised 
elections. Because there is no government mandated reporting require-
ment for private sector organising that occurs outside of the NLRB, data 
on the nature and extent of these campaigns is also very limited. We are 
currently in the process of compiling the first ever national database of 
non-board campaigns. To date we have gathered data from nearly every 
service sector, public sector and industrial union, but are still missing the 
bulk of the building trades and entertainment unions data because they 
themselves have difficulty compiling their organising numbers. So, 
1
 See Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998 for a more comprehensive analysis of organis-
ing in the public sector. 
J 
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while incomplete, the preliminary non-board findings provide important 
insights into the nature and extent of these campaigns, the industries, 
employers, unions and workforce. 
What these data reveal is that the NLRB is no longer the primary ve-
hicle through which workers organise in the US today. More impor-
tantly, outside of construction and some security units, the overwhelming 
majority of the these campaigns are concentrated service sector units in 
communities of colour, in particular building services, wireless, health 
care, retail sales, warehouse and distribution, laundries and privatised 
social services. 
Public sector campaigns on the other hand were primarily concen-
trated among two groups: homecare workers and public school employ-
ees, primarily in non-professional units. Both groups are almost entirely 
female, including many women of colour. Other industries with signifi-
cant activity include state and local government employees, airline 
workers and graduate students and adjunct faculty organising in public 
sector higher education. Once again, these are all industries with high 
concentrations of women workers (Bronfenbrenner, 2005). 
For several unions, including UNITE HERE, CWA, AFSCME, AFT, 
and SEIU, the number of workers organised outside the NLRB process 
far outweighs those organised through NLRB elections, even in their 
primary industries. Notably, the workers being organised by SEIU, AFT, 
CWA, UNITE HERE and AFSCME, whether in healthcare, laundries, 
hotels, home care, wireless or public schools are primarily women, in-
cluding many women of colour. Thus, when taken together, these data 
suggest that many of the unions that have made the most organising 
gains, both inside and outside the NLRB process, are targeting industries 
where women of colour predominate. In combination, the data from 
NLRB and non-board campaigns also suggest that women are fast be-
coming not just the majority, but perhaps as much as 60 per cent of new 
workers organising each year. 
The Organising Environment 
Over the last 20 years I have conducted a series of studies to gain a better 
understanding of the factors determining union organising success or 
failure in organising in the global economy. While we are currently up-
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dating our research, the findings from our 1998-1999 study make clear 
that even a decade ago unions were operating in a much more global, 
mobile, and rapidly changing corporate environment. 
While a majority of private-sector organising campaigns continue to 
be concentrated in relatively small units in US-owned for-profit compa-
nies, these companies are increasingly subsidiaries of larger parent com-
panies (84 per cent), including many multinationals (62 per cent). This 
trend occurs not because unions are targeting large multinational compa-
nies, but because the US private sector economy is increasingly domi-
nated by multinational firms. Only one-third of all campaigns occur in 
for-profit companies with all sites and operations based in the US, while 
23 per cent take place in non-profit companies such as hospitals, social 
service agencies or educational institutions. 
Fifty-four per cent of all NLRB elections are concentrated in mobile 
industries where production can easily be shifted out of the state or out 
of the country. Not surprisingly, win rates average just 34 per cent in 
campaigns conducted in mobile industries compared to a 54 per cent win 
rate in immobile industries. Organising win rates average as high as 58 
per cent in non-profit companies, compared to a 40 per cent win rate in 
for-profit companies. Among for-profit companies, win rates are highest 
for US-based companies with all sites in the US (45 per cent), and lower 
for foreign-based multinationals (29 per cent) and US-based multination-
als (39 per cent). Win rates are also much higher (63 per cent) in the 16 
per cent of the companies that are not a subsidiary of a larger parent 
company, compared to a 41 per cent win rate for companies that are sub-
sidiaries. 
2
 All of the data in the text, charts, and tables from this point forward was compiled as 
part of a study commissioned by the bi partisan Congressional US Trade Deficit Review 
Commission (USTDRC) in 2000. See Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004 and Bronfen-
brenner 2000 for an in-depth discussion of the research method used in conducting the 
research for the USTDRC study. 
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194 The State of the Unions 
Company Characteristics 
As would be expected, given that all of these elections occurred during 
the period of high corporate profitability in the late 1990s, 65 per cent of 
the companies in our sample were in good to excellent financial condi-
tion at the time the petition was filed (Figure 10.3). Overall, win rates are 
lower in companies in good to excellent financial condition (43 per cent) 
than in units in fair to poor financial condition (47 per cent), reflecting 
the fact that more profitable companies have greater resources to im-
prove conditions for workers and to devote to an aggressive anti-union 
campaign. 
Fifteen per cent of the elections take place in firms with other organ-
ised units at the same location as the unit being organised. A much larger 
percentage of companies (60 per cent) have other organised units at other 
sites and locations of the company, either in the US or abroad. For nearly 
half of the campaigns in our sample (46 per cent), there was a previous, 
unsuccessful, attempt to organise the unit. 
Figure 10.6 also presents findings on company practices before the 
organising campaign took place. Nearly a third of the units already had 
an employee involvement or team system in place before the election, 
while 21 per cent had had threats of full or partial plant closure, and 18 
per cent reported changes in company ownership. Both pre-campaign 
employee involvement programs and pre-campaign plant closing threats 
are associated with win rates 7 to 12 percentage points lower than in 
units where they are not present. In contrast, changes in company owner-
ship are associated with win rates 13 percentage points higher than in 
units where there had been no change in ownership prior to the cam-
paign. This may be because a change in company ownership is more 
likely to be associated with practices such as job combinations, wage and 
benefit reductions, and increases in the pace of work which, in combina-
tion, may motivate workers to initiate a union campaign and vote for a 
union. 
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Our findings on bargaining unit demographics also confirm that organis-
ing is increasingly concentrated in units with a majority of women and 
people of colour (Figure 10.4).Only 35 per cent of the units have a ma-
jority of white men, while women make up the majority in 44 per cent of 
the units and workers of colour make up the majority in 39 per cent of 
the units. Win rates increase substantially as the proportion of women 
and workers of colour increases. While they average only 35 per cent in 
units with a majority of white men, win rates are 53 per cent in units 
with a majority of workers of colour, 56 per cent in units with at least 75 
per cent workers of colour, 58 per cent in units with a majority of 
women, and 62 per cent in units with at least 75 per cent women. The 
highest win rates are 82 per cent for units with 75 per cent or more 
women workers of colour. The higher win rates in these units mean that 
not only are women and workers of colour, in particular women of col-
our, participating in union elections in ever increasing numbers; but, be-
cause win rates are so much higher in these units, the vast majority of 
new workers coming into the labour movement today are women and 
people of colour. 
Recent immigrants and undocumented workers have been involved 
in many of the largest organising victories in the last five years in indus-
tries such as home care^ hotel, laundry, building services, drywall and 
asbestos removal. However, most of those campaigns have been outside 
of the NLRB process. In contrast, only 8 per cent of all the elections in 
our sample were in units with 25 per cent or more recent immigrants and 
only 7 per cent of the campaigns had undocumented workers in the unit. 
The win rate averages as high as 58 per cent in units with at least 25 per 
cent recent immigrants, but drops down to 36 per cent in units with un-
documented workers. This reflects the ability and willingness of employ-
ers to use the threat of deportation to thwart organising efforts among 
undocumented workers and also suggests one of the reasons why card 
check neutrality campaigns are so important in organising industries with 
large numbers of undocumented workers. 
Employer Behaviour 
Consistent with earlier research, we find that the overwhelming majority 
of employers aggressively oppose union organising efforts through a 
198 The State of the Unions 
combination of threats, discharges, promises of improvements, unsched-
uled unilateral changes in wages and benefits, bribes and surveillance. 
Figure 10.5 presents data on the most commonly used employer anti-
union tactics, listed in order from those tactics used most frequently by 
employers in NLRB certification elections to those tactics which are 
used least frequently by employers. As Figure 10.5 shows, the use of 
traditional employer anti-union tactics has become quite pervasive, and, 
both individually and in combination, these tactics are extremely effec-
tive in reducing union election win rates. 
Fifty-two per cent of all employers and 68 per cent of those in mo-
bile industries made threats of full or partial plant closure during the or-
ganising drive. Approximately one in every four employers (26 per cent) 
discharged workers for union activity, while 48 per cent made promises 
of improvement, 20 per cent gave unscheduled wage increases, and 17 
per cent made unilateral changes in benefits and working conditions. 
Sixty-seven per cent of the employers held supervisor one-on-ones with 
employees at least weekly, 34 per cent gave bribes or special favors to 
those who opposed the union, 31 per cent assisted the anti-union com-
mittee, and 10 per cent used electronic surveillance of union activists 
during the organising campaign. Employers threatened to refer undocu-
mented workers to the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) in 7 
per cent of all campaigns and in 52 per cent of cases where undocu-
mented workers were present. 
Consistent with previous research, we find that for the most aggres-
sive individual employer anti-union tactics, win rates average ten to 
twenty percentage points lower in campaigns where the tactic is used 
compared to campaigns where the employer does not use the tactic. For 
just two tactics, promoted pro-union activists and used the media, the 
win rate is actually higher in units where those tactics are used compared 
to the win rate where they are not used. One possible explanation is that 
employers only bother to promote union activists out of the unit or run a 
media campaign when there is a strong chance the union will win. 
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As described in Figure 10.6, the majority of employers use a combina-
tion of tactics. Forty-eight per cent of the employers ran moderately ag-
gressive anti-union campaigns using five to nine tactics, 26 per cent of 
the employers ran extremely aggressive campaigns using ten or more 
tactics, but only 23 per cent ran a weak campaign using one to four anti-
union tactics. Employers ran no campaign whatsoever against the union 
in only 3 per cent of the cases in our sample, 93 per cent of which the 
union won. Overall, the win rate drops to 55 per cent for units where 
employers used one to four anti-union tactics, 39 per cent where they 
used five to nine tactics, and 34 per cent where they used ten or more. 
The fact that there is only a slight drop in win rates between moderately 
aggressive and extremely aggressive employer campaigns suggests that 
in some units aggressive anti-union behavior by employers may reach a 
point of diminishing returns, particularly at a time when unions are run-
ning more aggressive and sophisticated campaigns and workers' trust in 
corporations is declining. 
Union Organising Tactics 
We have shown just how challenging the organising environment has 
become for unions organising in the private sector. Workers in almost 
every industry face more sophisticated employer opposition to organis-
ing coupled with dramatic increases in corporate restructuring, foreign 
trade and investment, and shifts in work and production to other compa-
nies and other countries. Yet that does not tell the entire story about the 
state of union organising today. National organising data also show that 
some unions have been able to win even against some of the nation's 
most formidable anti-union employers, even in the most mobile and most 
global industries. This raises the critical question about what role union 
strategies play in determining whether or not unions succeed in organis-
ing large numbers of new workers in their primary industries. 
When we first conducted research to examine these questions in the 
late 1980s, we found that unions were more likely to win NLRB elec-
tions if they used rank-and-file-intensive tactics such as person-to-person 
contact, active representative committees, member volunteer organisers, 
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solidarity days, and building for the first contract before the election. 
This research also found that union tactics as a group had a more signifi-
cant impact on election outcomes than other groups of variables such as 
election environment, bargaining unit demographics, organiser back-
ground, and employer tactics. 
This process did not happen all at once. By the early 1990s tradi-
tional organising approaches and the isolated use of innovative tactics 
gradually decreased in effectiveness as the organising climate became 
more complex and employer opposition more sophisticated. Yet, when 
these variables were combined into a comprehensive union-building tac-
tic variable, adding one unit for each additional union-building tactic 
used, the probability of the union winning the election increased by as 
much as 9 per cent for each additional tactic, suggesting that individual 
union tactics had become less important in determining election outcome 
than a comprehensive union building campaign that incorporated person-
to-person contact, leadership development, escalating internal and exter-
nal pressure tactics, and building for the first contract. 
Unfortunately, although we found many unions were running more 
effective and aggressive organising campaigns than they were a decade 
ago, the majority of unions continue to run relatively weak campaigns. 
Even unions that do use more innovative and rank-and-file intensive tac-
tics tend to use them piecemeal rather than as part of a sophisticated, 
comprehensive, and consistent strategy. What is most striking about 
these results is the inconsistency in the use of the tactics both within 
campaigns and over time. Although organiser training programs and ma-
terials have been emphasising the importance of these tactics for more 
than a decade, these data suggest that, even today, only a small number 
of unions are using these tactics in a consistent way, and even those that 
do, tend to use them in isolation, not as part of a comprehensive multi-
For more information see Bronfenbrenner and Juravich's earlier research on union or-
ganising strategies. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, 'The Role of Union Strategies in NLRB 
Certification Elections.' Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50(2): 195-221 and Kate 
Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich, 'It Takes More than House Calls: Organising to Win 
with a Comprehensive Union-Building Strategy,' and Tom Juravich and Kate Bronfen-
brenner, 'Preparing for the Worst: Organising and Staying Organised in the Public Sec-
tor' in Kate Bronfenbrenner and Sheldon Friedman, et al. (eds.), Organising to Win: New 
Research on Union Strategies. Ithaca: NY: ILR Press, 1998. 
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faceted campaign. Most significantly, in light of labour's much touted 
effort at 'changing to organise', there has been only a minimal increase 
in the use of these tactics, both individually and in combination, since 
1995, far from what is required to increase union density and bargaining 
power. 
What the data on organising tactics and organiser background reveal 
is that in the current organising environment it is not enough to simply 
utilise as many union tactics or recruit as many organisers as possible. 
Instead, for unions to make any significant organising gains in the pri-
vate sector they will have to mount organising campaigns that are more 
aggressive, comprehensive, creative, and strategic and they will need to 
recruit and train enough organisers to effectively mount these more com-
prehensive campaigns. TBased on our analysis of the evolution of success-
ful union organising over time, a new model of comprehensive union 
strategies emerges that is based on two fundamental principles. The first 
is that union success in certification elections depends on a comprehen-
sive union-building strategy that incorporates the following ten elements, 
each of which is a cluster of key union tactics that are critical to union 
organising success: 
1. Adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources 
2. Strategic targeting and research 
3. Active and representative rank-and-file organising committees 
4. Active participation of member volunteer organisers 
5. Person to person contact inside and outside the workplace 
6. Benchmarks and assessments to monitor union support and set 
thresholds for moving ahead with the campaign 
7. Issues which resonate in the workplace and in the community 
8. Creative, escalating internal pressure tactics involving members in 
the workplace 
9. Creative, escalating external pressure tactics involving members out-
side the workplace, locally, nationally, and/or internationally 
10. Building for the first contract during the organising campaign. 
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These strategic elements, which we will call comprehensive organising 
tactics, may each be associated with higher win rates and/or have statisti-
cally significant positive effects on election outcome. However, given 
the hostile climate in which unions must operate, the use of these indi-
vidual comprehensive organising tactics will not be enough. Instead, un-
ion gains will depend on a multi-faceted campaign utilising as many of 
the ten comprehensive organising tactics as possible and that the likeli-
hood of the union winning the election will significantly increase for 
each additional comprehensive organising tactic utilised by the union. 
The second principle underlying the comprehensive organising 
model is that differences in the quality and intensity of the campaigns 
between unions are a better predictor of differences in election outcomes 
for those unions than employer opposition, bargaining unit demograph-
ics, or company or industry characteristics. We do not suggest that indus-
try, corporate structure, unit type, worker demographics, or employer 
opposition do not matter. All of these factors have a very powerful and 
significant impact on union win rates. Indeed, it is more difficult to or-
ganise mobile industries, such as metal production and fabrication, gar-
ment and textile, food processing, and call centers, in the current global 
trade and investment climate. It is also more difficult to organise subsidi-
aries of large multinational corporations that have the resources to launch 
a full-scale counterattack against the union campaign. Furthermore, 
higher paid, primarily white male, blue collar, white collar, and profes-
sional and technical occupations are more difficult to organise in the cur-
rent climate because they tend to be more affected by threats of job loss 
or blacklisting that are typical in employer campaigns today. Although 
industry, unit type, worker demographics and employer characteristics 
and tactics matter, union tactics matter more, because unions have so far 
to go before they live up to their full potential. While the majority of un-
ions today run very weak campaigns with no underlying strategy, the 
majority of employers run very strategic campaigns, taking full advan-
tage of the range of effective anti-union tactics available to them, and 
adapting and tailoring those tactics depending on the organising envi-
ronment and the union's campaign. 
If all unions were running aggressive comprehensive campaigns and 
win rates continued to vary across the organising environments in which 
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ment would play the primary role in explaining the variance in organis-
ing success between unions. Instead, the more successful unions owe 
their organising victories to the nature, quality, intensity and comprehen-
siveness of their campaigns, across a diversity of industries, companies, 
bargaining units and employer campaigns. Similarly, unions with lower 
win rates lose more elections because of the lack of intensity, quality and 
comprehensiveness of the campaigns they run rather than the organising 
environment in which they operate. 
Each of the ten elements of the comprehensive organising model en-
hances the union's organising power in a unique way. Unions that allo-
cate adequate staff and financial resources, for example, make an institu-
tional commitment to be more intensely engaged in the campaign, recruit 
and organising of staff that is demographically representative of the 
workers they organise, and run more campaigns. Unions that engage in 
strategic targeting tend to approach organising as a means to build bar-
gaining power within certain sectors and industries, in contrast to the 
non-strategic 'hot-shop' organising model. 
Perhaps the single most important component of a comprehensive 
campaign is an active, representative committee that gives bargaining 
unit members ownership of the campaign, allows the workers to start 
acting like a union inside the workplace, builds trust and confidence 
among the workforce and counteracts the most negative aspects of the 
employer campaign. 
The use of member volunteers to assist in organising campaigns re-
flects a combination of greater institutional integration of current and 
potential new members, and an emphasis on a worker-to-worker ap-
proach to organising. Person-to-person contacts made inside and outside 
the workplace enhance the union's organising power by providing the 
intensive one-on-one contacts necessary to build and sustain worker 
commitment to unionisation both at home and in the increasingly hostile 
election environment at work. 
The combination of benchmarks and assessments allows unions to 
evaluate worker support for the union at different stages of the campaign 
in order to better adjust their strategy to the unit they are trying to organ-
ise and to set thresholds to determine when, and whether, they are ready 
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to move on to the next stage of the campaign. A focus on issues that 
resonate with the workers and the community, such as respect, dignity, 
fairness, service quality and union power and voice, is essential both to 
build worker commitment to withstand the employer campaign and to 
gain community support. 
Internal pressure tactics allow the union to start acting like a union 
before the election takes place, building solidarity and commitment 
among the workers being organised and restraining employer opposition. 
External pressure tactics that exert leverage on the employer both in the 
local community and in their national and/or international operations are 
essential to organising in the increasingly global corporate environment. 
Finally, building for the first contract before the election helps build con-
fidence in the workers being organised, showing them what the union is 
all about and signaling to the employer that the union is there for the 
long haul. 
While each of the ten elements of the model are important in them-
selves, their ultimate effectiveness depends upon them being integrated 
as part of a larger comprehensive campaign using as many of the ten 
elements of the model as possible, with each tactic enabling and amplify-
ing the effectiveness of the others. At the core are the three building 
blocks of any organising campaign upon which all the other comprehen-
sive tactics depend: adequate and appropriate staff and financial je-
sources, active representative committee and benchmarks and assess-
ments. In the absence of adequate and appropriate resources, unions will 
be unable to staff and finance the labour-intensive, grassroots tactics that 
a comprehensive organising campaign requires, from conducting in-
depth research on company ownership, to recruiting and training staff, 
member volunteers, and organising committee members, to engaging in 
escalating pressure tactics in the workplace and the community. Simi-
larly, a representative and active committee is necessary to develop rank-
and-file leadership, build the union inside the workplace, and make con-
nections between workers and the community outside the workplace. 
And, without benchmarks and assessments, the union is flying blind, un-
able to evaluate the effectiveness of the campaign tactics they have cho-
sen and when, whether, and how best to move forward with the cam-
paign. 
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All of the comprehensive organising tactics are more likely to be 
used in winning campaigns than in losing ones. The results are particu-
larly striking for the three core comprehensive tactics - adequate and 
appropriate resources (used in 21 per cent of winning campaigns but 
only 9 per cent of losing campaigns), active representative committees 
(33 per cent of winning campaigns compared to only 21 per cent of los-
ing campaigns), and benchmarks and assessments (35 per cent of win-
ning campaigns compared to only 14 per cent of losing campaigns). 
As described in Figure 10.7, each of the individual elements in the 
model are associated with win rates that average between 4 to 28 per-
centage points higher than in campaigns where they are not utilised. 
Once again the most dramatic differences in win rates are associated 
with adequate and appropriate resources (64 per cent when present, 41 
per cent when not present), active representative committee (56 per cent 
when present, 41 per cent when not present), and benchmarks and as-
sessments (66 per cent when present, 38 per cent when not present). 
The smallest differences are associated with issues that resonate in 
the workplace and community (49 per cent when present, 43 per cent 
when not present) and external pressure tactics (48 per cent when pre-
sent, 44 per cent when not present). This is to be expected given that es-
calating external pressure tactics tend to be only used in campaigns with 
aggressive employer opposition, while the effectiveness of issues is 
highly dependent on the tactics unions use to get their message across. 
In our survey of organising campaigns we found that win rates in-
crease dramatically for each additional tactic used, starting at 32 per cent 
for no comprehensive organising tactics, and then increase to 44 per cent 
for one to five tactics, 68 per cent for more than five tactics, and 100 per 
cent for the 1 per cent of the campaigns where unions use eight tactics. 
At the same time, the per cent of campaigns where the tactics were used 
steadily declines as the number of tactics increases (Figure 10.8). Four-
teen per cent of all campaigns use no comprehensive organising tactics, 
54 per cent use fewer than three tactics, while only 10 per cent of all 
campaigns use more than five tactics and none use more than eight. 
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Across all industrial sectors, per cent win rates are much higher in elec-
tions where unions use a comprehensive organising strategy incorporat-
ing more than five comprehensive tactics, compared to campaigns where 
they use five or fewer tactics (Figure 10.9). In manufacturing the win 
rate averages only 20 per cent in campaigns where unions use no com-
prehensive organising tactics, increasing only slightly to 29 per cent 
when they use between one and five tactics, but then jump to 63 per cent 
in the campaigns where they use more than five tactics. In the service 
sector the unions win 44 per cent of campaigns where no tactics are used, 
57 per cent in campaigns where one to five tactics are used, and 68 per 
cent in campaigns where more than five comprehensive tactics are used. 
In all other sectors combined, (communications, construction, transporta-
tion, retail/wholesale, and utilities) the win rate associated with cam-
paigns where they use no comprehensive tactics is 29 per cent, increas-
ing to 45 per cent where one to five tactics are used, and 75 per cent 
where more than five comprehensive tactics are used. Thus, we find that 
a comprehensive organising strategy improves election outcomes sub-
stantially, across all sectors of the economy, even in the most mobile and 
global industries. 
While these data are limited to NLRB campaigns, our interviews 
with organisers and union leaders who have been successfully organising 
through card-check neutrality agreements, paint a similar picture. The 
unions that have brought in the most new members through organising 
outside the traditional board process (SEIU in building services, CWA in 
wireless, UNITE HERE in hotels, distribution centers and laundries) 
have only succeeded in these endeavors because they have been follow-
ing a more comprehensive organising strategy, in particular adequate and 
appropriate staff and financial resources, strategic targeting, member 
volunteer organisers, a focus on issues that resonate with the workplace 
and the broader community, internal and external pressure tactics, and 
building for the first contract during the organising drive. Those that 
have been least successful in winning non-board campaigns have fo-
cused on external leverage at the expense of building an active represen-
tative committee, person-to-person contact in the workplace and com-
munity, and escalating internal pressure tactics. Often they have also 
failed to do the strategic research or commit sufficient resources to 
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mount the kind of campaign necessary to make the cost of fighting the 
union greater than the cost of voluntarily recognising the union and bar-
gaining a first agreement. 
Comprehensive Organising Tactics and Employer Behaviour 
As we described earlier in the chapter, the overwhelming majority of 
employers aggressively oppose union organising efforts through a com-
bination of legal and illegal anti-union tactics designed to dissuade work-
ers from voting for the union. Yet, union win rates associated with all of 
the individual aggressive employer tactics increase between 10 and 40 
percentage points when unions use a comprehensive organising strategy 
using more than five tactics in our model compared to campaigns where 
they used fewer than five tactics. 
The smallest differences in win rates are in campaigns where the 
employer institutes an employee involvement program, and where the 
employer threatens to bring in INS in units with undocumented workers. 
This is consistent with previous research that the use of these employer 
tactics is particularly effective at undermining worker support for the 
union. When employers use these tactics it requires that the union use a 
much more comprehensive campaign than those run by the unions in our 
sample, one that uses eight, nine, or even all ten elements of the model, 
rather than just five or six. 
In addition to examining win rates associated with comprehensive 
organising tactics and individual employer tactics it is important to as-
sess the impact of more aggressive comprehensive union campaigns rela-
tive to the overall intensity of the employer campaign. Figure 10.10 com-
pares win rates in campaigns with weak employer opposition, moder-
ately-aggressive employer opposition, and aggressive employer opposi-
tion in elections where the union ran a comprehensive campaign using 
more than five comprehensive organising tactics versus elections where 
the union used five or fewer comprehensive organising tactics (no com-
prehensive campaign). 
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The results are striking. In elections with moderately aggressive em-
ployer campaigns, win rates average 93 per cent when the union runs a 
comprehensive campaign but drop to 35 per cent when the union fails to 
run a comprehensive campaign. Even in campaigns with aggressive em-
ployer opposition, win rates average 52 per cent overall in elections 
where the union ran a comprehensive campaign compared to only 29 per 
cent in campaigns where the union failed to run a comprehensive cam-
paign. 
Overall, unions are running comprehensive campaigns in 20 per cent 
of elections with aggressive employer opposition, 7 per cent of elections 
with moderately aggressive employer opposition, and 5 per cent of elec-
tions with weak employer opposition. These data confirm that while the 
majority of employers run aggressive campaigns taking full strategic ad-
vantage of a broad range of anti-union tactics, the majority of unions 
continue to run fairly weak campaigns, even when faced with aggressive 
employer opposition. Indeed, there were only two campaigns in our 
sample, where, when faced with aggressive employer opposition, unions 
used more than six comprehensive organising tactics. Both of those elec-
tions were won. Thus, consistent with our model, although employer 
anti-union campaigns can and often do have a devastating impact on un-
ion organising success, unions can increase their win rates, even in the 
face of the most aggressive employer opposition, if they run comprehen-
sive campaigns. 
Unions and Comprehensive Organising Tactics 
As we have discussed so far, there is no question that some unions, such 
as the UAW in auto-transplants and auto-parts, CWA/IUE in high tech 
and electronics, USWA in metal production and fabrication or the 
UFCW in food processing, face much greater challenges organising in 
their primary jurisdictions because they are confronted with more mo-
bile, more global, and more powerful and effective employer opposition, 
and, in some cases, a workforce less predisposed to unionisation. Yet, as 
we have seen, even in the most adverse organising environments, union 
organising success can dramatically improve when unions utilise a com-
prehensive campaign strategy. Given these differences, what is perhaps 
most striking about our findings is how few unions are actually running 
comprehensive campaigns, < 
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fferences, what is perhaps 
nions are actually running 
comprehensive campaigns, or even consistently using any of the ten ele-
ments of our comprehensive campaign model. Most significant of all, only 
a smattering of unions today see themselves as global unions taking on 
global employers. They are not doing the strategic corporate research nec-
essary to develop the kind of critique of the company needed to launch a 
truly multifaceted comprehensive campaign. They are not developing last-
ing labour and community networks, locally, nationally and internationally 
to help them build and leverage their power in the company and the indus-
try. And they are not getting out in front on the issues that resonate with 
workers and the public ranging from universal health care, to the war in 
Iraq, global outsourcing, to affordable higher education. 
But while the US labour movement is in crisis and has not made a 
great deal of progress as it chases a bar that seems to keep moving fur-
ther and further out of reach, there is something very different about the 
labour movement of 2008 than the labour movement of a decade ago. 
They are no longer sitting on the sidelines blaming everyone but them-
selves and waiting to be rescued by labour law reform alone. US unions 
may not be having great success at organising growth but today at least 
most of them are trying to figure out how to get it right. They are paying 
for independent academic research to critically look at what they are do-
ing and try to help figure out how to do it better. And while they aren't 
very good at taking criticism from each other, they have been more will-
ing to step out of the cold war restraints and meet with unions from all 
over the world who have a stake in a common employer. 
Yet, they also are holding themselves back. Because for all their ef-
fort, the single greatest barrier to union organising success in the US to-
day may be internal divisions within unions and the movement itself, 
resulting from restructuring, mergers, raids, both between and within the 
CTW and the AFL-CIO and affiliates. Because it is these issues now that 
are dominating the news, sapping morale, distracting their focus and 
making it more difficult to both inspire unorganised workers to take the 
risks that it takes to organise, and a new generation of young people to 
come work with the labour movement. If they are not resolved, all the 
new strategies and effort will be in vain because unions divided against 
themselves will not have the power to organise in this economy. Neither 
strategy nor solidarity alone is sufficient to organise today, but instead 
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both are necessary. And of late, it seems within some unions, one or the 
other or both are in short supply. 
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